It challenged the view of Al Qa'eda as a Mafia-styled network, with branches in many countries, with Osama Bin Laden as it's head. This interested me, as I have been saying for a while that far, far too many acts of terrorism are conveniently drawn back to this big "bogeyman" terror "network".

The evidence was presented thus:

-The "Al Qa'eda Terror Network" became known to the world in 1998, as four men accused of the Nairobi embassy bombing stood trial. Additionally, US prosecutors wished to try Bin Laden in absentia - but because of the nature of US law, this can only be carried out if there is evidence that he is the head of an organised operation (laws were drawn up to combat the Mafia). Now, there was a man who had been ferried from security service to security service in many nations, none of which wanted much to do with him. He offered the US "evidence" that could prove that Bin Laden's group was a big, organised network. In essence, he drew up the entire picture of "The Network", according to what US law needed.

-"Al Qa'eda" is a name that was invented for this "network" by the informant. Bin Laden never called anything "Al Qa'eda" up until after the 9/11 attacks, when he realised that was the name Americans had given to his organisation.

-Now, on to the organisation. Bin Laden is a terrorist, and a fundamental Islamic Jihadist. No questions there. However, what he does not have, is a big "terror network". The "Al Qa'eda fighters" in Afghanistan (now Cuba, those that survived) were nothing of the sort - they WERE radical Islamists being trained to stage Islamic revolutions in their own countries. Al Zarqawi, Bin Laden's henchman and the real ideological power of the throne, is a splinter from the radical Islamic doctrine - he believes, as does Bin Laden, in high-profile terror attacks to bring about Islamic revolution. These two men were very much fringe figures, because of their disagreements with the revolutionaries. "Terrorist training camps" in Afghanistan were REVOLUTIONARY training camps.

-Now, Bin Laden and Al Zarqawi use select members of these groups occasionally for special projects to further their agenda - as evinced with the Nairobi bombings etc. In other cases, they served merely as "bankroll men" - 9/11 is one of these cases. The 9/11 attackers were not members of Bin Laden's small group, but he did fund them and give his blessing for their operation. Only after 9/11 does Bin Laden become a key figure among the Islamic revolutionaries. To illustrate their lack of standing, a video clip of Bin Laden walking around with a large group of masked, armed mujaheddin. It turns out that these men were paid for the day, to turn up to that particular photo opportunity - and to bring their own stuff.

-There is no one, large, centralised terror network. Sure, sometimes terrorists interact, but mostly they act independenty of each other. There is certainly no "criminal mastermind" behind it all. "Al Qa'eda" effectively, is a myth. What is true is that Bin Laden has a small, close-knit cell of cronies, who would bankroll and support various operations. No more, no less. Until recently, of course, where he became poster-boy for Islamic Jihadism, courtesy of the western media.

-In Afghanistan, Islamism as an effective revolutionary force was wiped out to great success. A victory for the stability of the region. However, it did nothing against Al Qa'eda, because the huge network does not exist. Bin Laden's huge, sophisticated cave networks did not exist (despite claims by Mr. Rumsfeld that there are "not one, but several" and they are "large enough to store tanks").

-Simply put, the war on terror is far, far more complicated than the ludicrous asserion that there is one, Soviet Union-esque "organisation of Evil" that can be confronted and fought. There is no terrorist network, only terrorists. For the west to succeed, a far more analytical approach is required.